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HYDRAULIC FRACTURING AND COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM: INJECTING REALITY INTO POLICY
FORMATION
Gianna Cricco-Lizza

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Energy independence and the importance of domestic sources
of energy are pressing concerns in today’s global political environ1
ment. Shale gas development increasingly relies on hydraulic fracturing to stimulate production as domestic natural gas resources are
2
depleted. Hydraulic fracturing is a method of increasing the volume
3
of coal-bed methane gas extracted from high-density sources. Environmental organizations have raised serious concerns regarding
states’ diverse regulatory schemes and whether the federal govern4
ment should provide uniform standards. The Environmental Protec∗

J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Columbia
University. I want to express deep gratitude to Professor Marc Poirier for his excellent guidance and breadth of knowledge regarding all aspects of environmental law,
to Brigitte Radigan for her supervision and valuable editing, and to my family, Evan
Haggerty, and my friends for their comments and assistance.
1
See INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.102: SUPPORTING
HYDROCARBON EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COASTAL PLAIN OF ANWR AS
PART OF THE NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY (2009) (noting that importing sixty percent of
oil that the United States needs costs more than $400 billion every year, without considering the costs of providing military protection to that oil supply).
2
See INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.106: SUPPORTING
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2009) (noting that “domestic production of natural gas is expected
to increase as a share of U.S. supply from 84 percent in 2007 to 97 percent in 2030,”
with shale gas formations gaining prominence as the fastest growing source within
the same timeframe); ANDREW BRADFORD, BENTEK ENERGY, MARCELLUS SHALE &
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NORTHEAST 13 (2010) (indicating that Pennsylvania’s active rig
count—including directional, vertical, and horizontal wells—increased from forty in
April
2009
to
115
in
April
2010),
available
at
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/BENTEK_Market_Update__MACRU
C_100629.pdf.
3
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OPPORTUNITY FOR STAKEHOLDER INPUT ON EPA’S
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RESEARCH STUDY: STUDY DESIGN 1 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/hydrofrac_landscapemodel.pdf.
4
See infra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
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tion Agency’s (EPA) future role in regulation of this process is unclear.
This Comment argues that a model of modified cooperative federalism should be applied to the controversy surrounding the EPA’s
regulation of hydraulic fracturing. A relationship of this nature—
one in which the federal government agency produces a simple, final
scientific answer to calm individual fears of new technology but leaves
regulation to local governments—will provide more comprehensive,
protective, and accountable regulation of the industry, while preserving some balance between the competing environmental and industrial interests. Part II discusses background information regarding
the mechanical process of hydraulic fracturing. Part III focuses on
already implemented state solutions in addition to issues arising in
states overlaying the Marcellus Shale. Part III also briefly identifies
which federal statutes regulate parts of the hydraulic fracturing process and which gaps the Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of
Chemicals Act (“FRAC Act”) is intended to fill. Part III additionally
surveys science and policy related to the EPA’s regulation of this area,
particularly the precautionary principle, and analyzes a previous study
of hydraulic fracturing. Part IV presents the concept of cooperative
federalism and an illustration of how lack of designated authority has
resulted in a catastrophic breakdown where federal and state powers
overlap. Part V analyzes how to apply cooperative federalism to the
controversy surrounding the EPA’s regulation of hydraulic fracturing.
Finally, Part VI summarizes the reasons why such a model should prevail in a situation where competing, highly valued interests must be
balanced.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Geology of the Marcellus Shale
5

For the past sixty years, commercial use of hydraulic fracturing
has helped exploration and development companies access uncon-

5
“The first commercial application of hydraulic fracturing as a well treatment
technology designed to stimulate the production of oil or gas likely occurred in either the Hugoton field of Kansas in 1946 or near Duncan Oklahoma in 1949.”
GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 21 (2009), available at
http://www.gwpc.org/elibrary/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%2
0Regulations%20Designed%20to%20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf.
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6

ventional sources of methane gas and has stimulated production in
7
subsiding wells. Recent utilization of the procedure has increased
access to methane gas in shale plays, which are discoveries of gas or
oil within geological formations of sufficient size to be worth subse8
quent exploration and development. In Texas, development of the
9
Barnett Shale began in Fort Worth during the 1980s. Subsequent
exploration has drawn industry attention to the natural resources
10
waiting 4,000 feet under the earth’s surface in the Marcellus Shale.
11
This shale play stretches from New York to Virginia.
The Marcellus Shale consists of Middle Devonian-age black, low12
density, organically rich shale with an average depth to its top rang13
ing from a mile in southwestern Pennsylvania to 6,000 feet in south-

6
“[U]nconventional . . . , for the non-specialist, means that it is challenging to
lift this oil [or gas] out of the ground.” Dave Cohen, An Unconventional Play in the
Bakken,
ENERGY
BULL.
(Apr.
16,
2008,
7:00
AM),
http://www.energybulletin.net/print/42850.
7
See STUART KEMP, HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVS., INC., COMMENTS OF
HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC. 6–7 (2010); see also JOSEPH H. FRANTZ, JR. &
VALERIE JOCHEN, SCHLUMBERGER MKTG. COMMC’NS, SHALE GAS 4 (2005), available at
http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2010/ph240/alnoaimi2/docs/shale_gas_solutio
n_05of299.pdf.
Early low-permeability horizontal wells were considered failures because they did not naturally produce at commercial rates. The explosive growth of horizontal wells in shales is due to improvements in
completion technologies. Multistage stimulation treatments are now
performed on these wells to place hydraulic fractures around the
borehole. The ability to economically perforate, stimulate, and isolate
multiple points along the lateral has made these wells commercial successes.
Id.
8
Nolan Hart, What Is a Shale Gas Play?, EAGLE FORD SHALE BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010,
9:47 AM), http://eaglefordshaleblog.com/2010/03/03/what-is-a-shale-gas-play/.
9
J. DANIEL ARTHUR ET AL., ALL CONSULTING, LLC, EVALUATING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN SHALE GAS RESERVES 2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.allllc.com/publicdownloads/ArthurHydrFracPaperFINAL.pdf.
10
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3; see also TIMOTHY CONSIDINE ET AL., PA. STATE UNIV., AN
EMERGING GIANT: PROSPECTS & ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DEVELOPING THE MARCELLUS
SHALE NATURAL GAS PLAY 6 (2009) (noting that the average depth of shale gas in the
Marcellus
Shale
is
one
mile),
available
at
http://alleghenyconference.org/PDFs/PELMisc/PSUStudyMarcellusShale072409.P
DF.
11
CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 2.
12
Id. at 4.
13
Id. at 6.
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14

eastern New York and 1,000 feet in the middle of New York. With
thickness of fifty feet to 200 feet, the shale “covers an area of 95,000
15
square miles.” While the shale has a lower gas content than some
16
other domestic plays, the estimated basin area is more than double
17
18
the size of the next largest in New Albany (43,500 square miles),
and almost ten times the size of the other five domestic plays: Barnett
19
20
(5000 square miles), Fayetteville (9000 square miles), Haynesville
21
22
(9000 square miles), Woodford (11,000 square miles), and Antrim
23
(12,000 square miles). In summary, the Marcellus Shale represents
a conveniently placed, extensive source of natural gas.

14
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING
REGULATORY
PROGRAM
4-19
(2009),
available
at
ftp://ftp.dec.state.ny.us/dmn/download/OGdSGEISFull.pdf.
15
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PRIMER 21 (2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oilgas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf.
16
ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 5 Exhibit 3.
As recently as 2002 the United States Geological Survey in its “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Appalachian Basin
Province,” calculated that the Marcellus Shale contained an estimated
undiscovered resource of about 1.9 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas.
Just five years later, Engelder (2009) estimates 2,445 trillion cubic feet
of reserves in place with recoverable reserves amounting to 489 trillion
cubic feet.
CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 4.
17
ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 2 Exhibit 1 (delineating on a map where shales exist:
“Gas Shale Basins of the United States with Estimated Gas Reserves”); id. at 5 Exhibit
3 (comparing various measurements of size and quality of reserves: “Comparison of
Data for the Gas Shales in the United States”); id. at 6 Exhibit 4 (matching period,
shale formation, and location: “Stratigraphy of the U.S. Gas Shales”). The Marcellus
Shale extends for 95,000 square miles, while the next largest shale is merely 43,500
square miles. Id. at 5 Exhibit 3.
18
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. The New Albany Shale is located under Illinois and Indiana
and the northwestern border of Kentucky, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, holding an estimated
19.2 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) in gas reserves, id. at 2 Exhibit 1.
19
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. The Barnett Shale is located beneath Texas, id. at 6 Exhibit
4, holding estimated reserves of 44 Tcf, id. at 5 Exhibit 3 .
20
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. The Fayetteville Shale is under Arkansas, id. at 6 Exhibit 4,
holding estimated reserves of 42 Tcf, id. at 5 Exhibit 3.
21
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. The Haynesville/Bossier Shale is under Texas and Louisiana, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, and holds reserves of approximately 264 Tcf id. at 5 Exhibit 3.
22
Id. at 5 Exhibit 3. The Woodford Shale is in both Texas and Oklahoma, id. at 6
Exhibit 4, with reserves of 11 Tcf, id. at 5 Exhibit 3.
23
ARTHUR, supra note 9, at 5 Exhibit 3. Antrim, beneath Michigan, id. at 6 Exhibit 4, holds reserves between 35 and 76 Tcf, id. at 5 Exhibit 3.
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B. Political and Economic Background to the Marcellus Shale’s
Development
Development of the Marcellus Shale presents the opportunity to
24
25
create jobs, encourage reliance on domestic natural resources, and
smoothly assist the transition from fossil fuels to greener sources of
26
energy. Natural gas extraction is important because of the potential
27
to use natural gas as a “bridge fuel” that will encourage the transition from traditional sources of energy to more renewable, greener
28
sources. Shale gas is projected to amount to fifty percent of the U.S.
natural gas supply by 2035, up from twenty percent today and one
29
percent in 2000.
Market forces impacting natural gas production in the Marcellus
30
Shale operate at local, state, national, and global levels. Additionally, coal-fired electric power presents powerful competition in the
24

CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 17–18. The study estimates that total spending by
Marcellus Shale producers was $3.09 billion in 2008, $66 million of which on payroll
alone. Id. at 21–22.
25
Id. at 10, 32–33. “[W]ithin a 200-mile radius of the Marcellus, there is an existing and potential market of over 18 BCF per day.” Id. at 10.
26
James M. Tour et al., Green Carbon as a Bridge to Renewable Energy, 9 NATURE
MATERIALS 871, 871 (Oct. 22, 2010) (“The typical value of greenhouse gas emission
for natural gas is about half that of coal, or half as much CO2 per kilowatt hour.
Moreover, there is enough recoverable natural gas in shale deposits (shale gas) to
meet the world’s energy needs for the next 60 years.” (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)); INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.106: SUPPORTING
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2009). “[D]omestic production of natural gas is expected to increase as a share of U.S. supply from 84 percent in 2007 to 97 percent in 2030” and
natural gas currently comprises twenty-three percent of the United States’ energy
supply. Id.
27
See Tour et al., supra note 26, at 871. The article identifies the three elements
most abundant on Earth with “the capacity to store and produce enough energy to
power our civilization”: carbon, non-fissile uranium-238, and hydrogen. Id. at 872.
Because the current infrastructure is geared to carbon, however, the authors suggest
that a green carbon movement towards a hydrogen-based future would best serve
long-term national energy needs. Id. at 874.
28
Id.; see also INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.101:
URGING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL & GAS RESEARCH
AND TO ADEQUATELY FUND OIL & GAS RESEARCH INITIATIVES (2009) (proposing that
repeal of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 would result in a substantial reduction of
funding necessary to ensure that “American consumers have clean, reliable, and affordable supplies of oil and natural gas”).
29
IHS CAMBRIDGE ENERGY RESEARCH ASSOCS., FUELING NORTH AMERICA’S ENERGY
FUTURE: THE UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION & THE CARBON AGENDA, at
ES-1 (2010), available at http://www2.cera.com/docs/Executive_Summary.pdf.
30
CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 7 fig.2. Natural gas prices are still recovering from
the summer of 2008. Id.
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market, with natural gas only recently gaining an edge through lower
31
capital costs and strategic environmental considerations.
Widespread use of hydraulic fracturing has led to a surge in interest in
32
shales across the United States.
The Marcellus Shale is uniquely
situated as compared to other sources of natural gas due to its prox33
imity to major cities on the eastern seaboard. Pennsylvania and five
surrounding states engage in “current natural gas consumption [of]
34
9.5 BCF [billion cubic feet] per day.”
Additionally, this particular market relies on a similar level of
electric power derived from coal combustion, which yields a potential
35
market of at least eighteen BCF of natural gas per day. The shale’s
development implicates large sums of money both in the present and
the near future. In 2008, the shale’s development in Pennsylvania
alone generated $2.3 billion in total value added, as well as 29,000
36
jobs and $240 million in state and local taxes. The pace of development in the shale is rapidly transforming from the testing and
37
evaluation stage into full commercial production.
Some groups oppose development, including some citizens who
have previously leased land to oil companies for drilling, while other
citizens with land that could be leased are in favor of the practice of
38
hydraulic fracturing. Opponents argue that the wells were unobtru-

31

Id. at 7–10.
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25.
33
Id. at 25; Marcellus Shale—Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play, GEOLOGY.COM
(Oct. 30, 2009), http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml.
34
TIMOTHY CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE MARCELLUS SHALE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, & WEST VIRGINIA 11 (2010), available at
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/API_Economic
_Impacts_Marcellus_Shale.pdf. “[A]bundant supplies of natural gas would enable
electricity producers to cost effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions because
natural gas has considerably less carbon content than coal and oil.” Id. at iv.
35
CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 10.
There is also a considerable amount of coal-fired electric power generation in this region. In the unlikely event that all of this capacity was
converted to natural gas, an additional 9 BCF per day of natural gas
would be required. So within a 200-mile radius of the Marcellus, there
is an existing and potential market of over 18 BCF per day.
Id.
36
Id. at ii.
37
The pace of development of the shale resulted in such a dramatic increase in
economic output that estimated total value added to Pennsylvania for 2009 doubled,
while state and local taxes were predicted to increase to $400 million and total job
creation of 48,000. Id.
38
See infra notes 39–41, 43.
32
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sive, lucrative ways to use rights that were purchased when the home39
owners bought the land. Other people point to neighboring states
40
and either desire to follow the same lucrative paths or avoid suffering the lessons that citizens and leaders of other states have learned
41
through great pain and damage. Other citizens are fearful of the
dangerous consequences of hydrofracking—a few share fearful, bitter
stories of blighted or depleted water supply after companies hydro42
43
fracked coalbed methane (CBM) wells.
There are several public environmental concerns associated with
the process of hydraulic fracturing. The first issue is anecdotal evidence of changes in water quality (so-called introduction issues) and
quantity (so-called reduction issues) following the commencement of
44
fracking operations in communities.
Another source of concern
stems from personal stories of contaminated well water, dead farm
45
animals, and impaired human health. Environmental activists have
pointed to citizens’ experiences that are redolent with misinfor39

See Siobhan Hughes, New York Congressman’s Lead Slips as Gas-Drilling Fight Heats
Up, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20101021720593.html.
40
E.g., Andrew Maykuth, Strong Positions on Either Side of “Fracking” at EPA Hearing,
PHILLY.COM
(Sept.
14,
2010),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/marcellusshale/20100914_Strong_positions_on_either_side_of__quot_fracking_quot__at_EPA
_hearing.html. “[L]and owners such as Chris Ostrowsky expressed exasperation that
Pennsylvanians a few miles away in Susquehanna County were striking it rich while
New Yorkers were in limbo . . . . ‘It’s real frustrating to see what’s going on across the
border, how the economy is booming in Pennsylvania,’ Ostrowsky said.” Id.
41
E.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Reporter’s Notebook: Hydraulic Fracturing, YOUTUBE (Jan.
21, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yy556ACxJ2I.
42
Hydraulic fracturing is also known as “hydrofracking,” “fracking,” “frac’ing,”
and many other informal terms.
43
E.g., Mireya Navarro, Signing Drilling Leases, and Now Having Regrets, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2011, at A25; Katie Benner & Shelley DuBois, Odorless, Colorless: the Quiet Rise
of
American
Big
Gas,
FORTUNE (Oct.
1,
2010,
3:54
PM
ET),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/29/news/companies/fracking_natural_gas_indust
ry.fortune/index.htm; Louis Meeks, Gas Drilling Has Blighted My Life: We Need Energy
But Not at the Cost of Clean Water, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2010),
http://www.hcn.org/wotr/gas-drilling-has-blighted-my-life .
44
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1–2 (noting the potential contamination
of underground sources of drinking water (USDWs) or surface water through hydraulic fracturing processes and the impact on water quantity through the large volume of water used—each well could potentially use between two to five million gallons of water in drilling and hydrofracking the well).
45
Don Hopey, 1,200 Hear Marcellus Shale Debate EPA Hearing in Canonsburg One of
Four Nationwide, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 23, 2010, at A1 (“[Pennsylvania residents] attributed the problems to water contamination caused by the deep gas drilling operations that are increasing quickly through much of the state.”).
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mation concerning regulation and unsubstantiated incidents of water
46
contamination. This fear stems from a lack of public knowledge
47
concerning the components of the fracking fluid.
On June 9, 2009, U.S. Senators Robert P. Casey Jr. (D-PA) and
Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) and Representatives Diana DeGette (DCO), Maurice Hinchey (D-NY), and Jared Polis (D-CO) introduced
48
two companion bills dubbed the FRAC Act. The bills called for the
EPA to obtain jurisdiction over hydraulic fracturing under the Safe
49
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and for companies engaging in hydraulic fracturing to provide certain disclosures regarding the chemi50
cals used in the process. In 2010, the 111th Congress asked the EPA
to produce a study determining the risks to groundwater associated
51
with hydraulic fracturing, with anticipated results available in 2014.
Industry officials have welcomed the EPA’s decision to study the
complex relationship between hydraulic fracturing and drinking water to learn more about possible impacts hydraulic fracturing may
52
have on such a vital natural resource. Industry leaders, however,
fear that the study will preclude current development and have argued for a focused study that will present a final conclusive answer on
whether the EPA should be involved in regulation of hydraulic frac46

Tom Zeller, Jr., EPA to Study Chemicals Used to Tap Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 2010, at B3.
47
Hopey, supra note 45.
48
S. 1215, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. (2009); Abraham
Lustgarten, FRAC Act—Congress Introduces Twin Bills to Control Drilling and Protect
(June
9,
2009,
1:31
PM),
Drinking
Water,
PROPUBLICA
http://www.propublica.org/article/frac-act-congress-introduces-bills-to-controldrilling-609.
49
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2006).
50
S. 1215; H.R. 2766.
51
Zeller, supra note 46; Jim Efstathiou, New Yorkers Spar over U.S. EPA Study of NatET),
ural-Gas Fracturing, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:00 AM
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-13/new-york-gas-drilling-conflict-airedover-u-s-fracturing-study.html.
The EPA’s new study “needs to be carried out with the utmost care to
identify the full range of risks,” said Kate Sinding, senior attorney with
the New York-based Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental organization. “It is no exaggeration to say all eyes, both in the
United States and around the world, are on EPA.”
Id.
52
STUART KEMP, HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVS., INC., COMMENTS OF HALLIBURTON
ENERGY
SERVICES,
INC.
2
(2010),
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/D94C67ADFAC802C38525773E0064F
1AA/$File/Comments+of+Halliburton+Energy+Services+Inc+on+Hydraulic+Fracturi
ng+6-9-10.pdf.
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54

55

turing. A fear persists among industry insiders and consumers
that federal intrusion into the current state regulatory schemes will
drive up prices and deter the gas industry from investing in produc56
tion of this natural resource.
The bills introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives
seek to address these concerns through two mechanisms: first,
57
through amendment of the SDWA to remove the explicit exemption
58
of hydraulic fracturing from the EPA’s jurisdiction and second, by
requiring companies that use hydraulic fracturing to make public
and emergency disclosures of the additives injected into the wells in
53

KEMP, supra note 52, at 2; INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, supra note

2.
54

INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, RESOLUTION 09.011: SUPPORTING
CONTINUED ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF SHALE GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2009).
Hydraulic fracturing plays a major role in the development of virtually
all unconventional oil and gas resources and, thus, should not be limited in the absence of any evidence that such fracturing has damaged
the environment . . . . Regulation of hydraulic fracturing as underground injection under the SDWA would impose significant administrative costs on the state and substantially increase the cost of drilling
oil and gas wells with no resulting environmental benefits.
Id. Attached to Resolution 09.011 were the resolutions passed by Alaska (S.J.R. 14),
Alabama (H.J.R. 254), Louisiana (H.C.R. 38), Mississippi (S.C. 636), North Dakota
(S.C.R. 4020), Oklahoma (H.C.R. 1012), Utah (S.J.R. 17), Texas (H.C.R. 67), and
Wyoming (S.J. 0005).
55
Maykuth, supra note 39. “Broome County Executive Barbara Fiala declared
fracking ‘safe’ and expressed frustration with the slow pace of development in New
York. ‘All we ask is that this study be focused and not take forever to complete,’ she
said [at the EPA shareholder meeting in Binghamton, N.Y. in September 2010].” Id.
56
INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, supra note 54.
57
The FRAC Act aims to lift exemption of hydraulic fracturing from the Safe
Drinking Water Act imposed by the Environmental Policy Act of 2005. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 300h (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (2005). The
exemption was enacted following extensive lobbying by the oil and gas industry for
Congress to provide clarification about whether the EPA was required to regulate
hydraulic fracturing under state UIC programs. See Part III.C.1, infra; see also Hannah
Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil & Gas Production and
the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 167 (2009). Professor
Wiseman provides a comprehensive discussion of this history in Part V. Regulatory
Problems and the Need for Reform. Id.
58
Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act, S. 1215, 111th
Cong. § 2 (2009); Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009,
H.R. 2766, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). The Senate bill was reintroduced by Sen. Robert
Casey (D-PA), who sponsored the bill along with co-sponsors Benjamin Cardin (DMD), Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Frank Lautenberg (DNJ), Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Charles Schumer (D-NY), and Sheldon Whitehouse (DRI). S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011). Rep. Diana DeGette reintroduced the bill in the
House, along with thirty-seven co-sponsors. H.R. 1084, 112th Cong. (2011).
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59

the mix used to fracture the coal beds. Congress did not pass the
bills in the 111th Congress, nor has it passed them in the 112th Con60
gress to date.
III. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
A. The Mechanical Process of Hydraulic Fracturing
61

Hydraulic fracturing, combined with the recent advent of hori62
zontal drilling, has resulted in unprecedented potential to access
63
sources of methane gas that were previously too difficult to extract,
64
in terms of profit on investment. The mechanical process of hydraulic fracturing uses fluid pressure to fracture the material sur65
rounding the drill shaft. Operators inject fluids into vertical or horizontal wells at high pressure to generate fractures or exacerbate
66
existing fractures in the formation. The fluids largely consist of wa-

59

FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. § 2.
For the current status of these bills, see GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtr
ack.us/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). The bills may not be passed due to political impracticality; for instance, New York Congressman Hinchey faced a tight election as
his constituents began to appreciate the economic consequences of the moratorium
imposed by New York Department of Environmental Conservation following his push
for a study of hydraulic fracturing by the EPA. Hughes, supra note 39.
61
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 13 (“Large scale hydraulic fracturing, a
process first developed in Texas in the 1950s, was first used in the Barnett in 1986;
likewise, the first Barnett horizontal well was drilled in 1992.” (citing JEFF HAYDEN &
DAVE PURSELL, PICKERING ENERGY, INC., THE BARNETT SHALE—VISITOR’S GUIDE TO THE
HOTTEST GAS PLAY IN THE US (2005)).
62
John A. Harper, The Marcellus Shale—An Old “New” Gas Reservoir in Pennsylvania,
38 PA. GEOLOGY 2, 10 (2008). Horizontal drilling consists of drilling vertically until
the drill bit is at a specific height from the desired horizontal resource (the “kickoff
point”) at which point the drill is directed in an arc ending within the layer of material. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 52 Exhibit 30. The drill then moves
forward, now drilling parallel to the surface. See id.
63
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 13 (“The combination of sequenced
hydraulic fracture treatments and horizontal well completions has been crucial in
facilitating expansion of shale gas development. Prior to the successful application
of these two technologies in the Barnett Shale, shale gas resources in many basins
had been overlooked because production was not viewed as economically feasible.”
(citing Harper, supra note 62)).
64
Id. at 14 (“The combination of reduced economics and low permeability of gas
shale formations historically caused operators to bypass these formations and focus
on other resources.” (citing M. Airhart, The Barnett Shale Gas Boom: Igniting a Hunt for
Unconventional
Natural
Gas
Resources,
GEOLOGY.COM,
http://geology.com/research/barnett-shale-gas.shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2012))).
65
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1.
66
Id.
60
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ter with a small proportion of additives, which increase fluidity or
67
prevent contamination, and sand or some other proppant, which
keeps the fractures open and permits the gas to flow to the surface
68
freely.
The process of hydraulic fracturing begins with the construction
69
of a well pad, from which all subsequent operations are conducted.
Construction can take up to a month, following which the vertical
70
well shaft is drilled with a smaller rig. A larger rig is brought onsite
for the horizontal drilling, which also takes up to two weeks per well,
71
though more than one well may be drilled simultaneously. To prepare the well for fracturing, it is lined with casing that serves to prevent fluids from escaping into the environment except where the op72
erator directs them.
“Current well construction requirements
consist of installing multiple layers of protective steel casing and cement that are specifically designed and installed to protect fresh water aquifers and to ensure that the producing zone is isolated from
73
overlying formations.” The layered system of casings sealed with
cement is tested at several steps during the process to ensure that
“the casing used has sufficient strength, and that the cement has
74
properly bonded to the casing.” Preparation for the hydraulic fracture takes between one and two months, depending on the time
75
when the necessary equipment arrives. Coordinating the availability
of temporary tanks to store the water and the transportation of fracturing (“frac”) fluid, water, sand, and other equipment, including
76
computerized monitoring instruments, is essential. The process of
fracturing the well requires two to five days, “including approximately
77
40 to 100 hours of actual pumping.” Fluid return occurs over the

67
A proppant, usually a silica sand mix, serves to maintain the fractures in the
shale formation which were created through hydraulic pressure by “propping” them
open with a solid piece of material. See CONSIDINE, supra note 10, at 5.
68
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1; N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL.
CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-42.
69
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-124, tbl.5.15.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 51–52.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 52.
75
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-124, tbl.5.15.
76
Id.
77
Id.
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following two to eight weeks, with the volume of flowback fluid ac79
counting for thirty to seventy percent of the original fracture fluid.
These activities are subject to extensive state and federal regula80
tion, some of which are discussed below, as well as current industry
81
practices, which have been described elsewhere.
B. State Control
Comprehensive state and local laws manage the process of pro82
ducing oil and gas from exploration to delivery. Individual assessments of “geology, hydrology, climate, topography, industry characteristics, development history, state legal structures, population
density, and local economics” are appropriate and often form the ba83
sis for current regulatory schemes.
For instance, the wastewater
generated at wells employing hydraulic fracturing can be injected
deep underground into natural depositories, such as the depositories
84
in the Barnett Shale in Texas or in the Fayetteville Shale in Arkan85
sas. While this solution for water management is uniquely suited to
86
such geological formations, it may be utterly impracticable for a
state where the underlying geological formations would not be con87
ducive to such disposal methods.

78

Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66 (citing J. SATTERFIELD,
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP., MANAGING WATER RESOURCE’S CHALLENGES IN SELECT
NATURAL GAS SHALE PLAYS (2008)).
79
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66 (citing “[p]ersonal communication
with numerous operators and service companies in a variety of shale gas plays”).
80
For an overview of state statutes governing the disposal of produced fluid, see
infra Part III.B.1. For a description/overview of federal statutes currently addressing
disposal of flowback fluid, see infra Part III.C.1.
81
For a detailed discussion of the industry’s current practices of managing produced fluid, see U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 66–70.
82
Id. at 25.
83
Id.
84
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 69 Exhibit 39.
85
Adam J. Bailey, Comment, The Fayetteville Shale Play and the Need to Rethink Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas Development in Arkansas, 63 ARK. L. REV. 815, 821–
22 (2010).
86
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(3)(A) (2006) (“The regulations of the Administrator
under this section shall permit or provide for consideration of varying geologic, hydrological, or historical conditions in different States and in different areas within a
State.”).
87
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 69. “Underground injection of the
produced water is not possible in every play as suitable injection zones may not be
available. Similar to a producing reservoir, there must be a porous and permeable
formation capable of receiving injected fluids nearby.” Id.
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State Regulations in Place

State oil and gas regulatory agencies provide guidance for protection of the environment and workers onsite with regulations addressing a broad range of production activities, including permit requirements, the required depth of protective casing, and even the
88
time needed for the cement to dry before drilling continues. The
state regulatory approach has been described as a “cradle-to-grave”
method that covers everything from “the drilling and fracture of the
well, production operations, management and disposal of wastes, [to]
89
abandonment and plugging of the well.”
The regulations require permits before drilling can commence
and the application for such permits must include information regarding the well’s location, construction, operation, and reclama90
tion. Some states compel operators to post a financial security or
show financial resources sufficient to accomplish compliance with all
91
applicable regulations. States have also instituted voluntary reviews
of their relevant statutes to ensure that regulatory programs are up to
92
date and successful. All of the states overlying the Marcellus Shale
formation are members of the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
93
Commission (IOGCC). Other third parties also produce reviews for
88

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 52–53; see, e.g., IND. CODE § 14-37-7-5
(2011) (production string of casing requirement); 2010 KY. ACTS § 353.100 (casings
requirement); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 319.51 (2010) (supervisor of wells to provide regulations relating to casing among other well activities); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §
23-0305. (Gould 2012) (drilling, casing, and completion programs’ purpose in preventing pollution); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.503 (West 2010) (department’s authority
to “issue such orders” necessary to enforce provisions of oil and gas act); 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.8 (2012) (Texas Railroad Commission’s prohibition against pollution of either surface or subsurface water).
89
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26.
90
Id.; see, e.g., N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-16 (2009) (“No drilling activity shall
commence until such application is approved and a permit to drill is issued by the
director.”).
91
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 377.2425
(2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-238 (2010); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 715/5 (2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 324.61506 (p) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-1-104 (2010); N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0305 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.07 (LexisNexis
2011); 58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 601.503 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE R. § 22-21-6 (2010).
But see Keith G. Baurle, Reaping the Whirlwind: Federal Oil & Gas Development on Private
Lands in the Rocky Mountain West, 83 DENV. U.L. REV. 1083, 1085 n.12 (2006) (criticizing the adequacy of such bonds to protect landowners potentially harmed).
92
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
93
See Member States, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION,
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/member-states (last visited Mar. 21, 2012); Map of Marcellus
Shale,
INTERSTATE
OIL
&
GAS
COMPACT
COMMISSION,
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94

the public’s education. For instance, the Ground Water Protection
Council (GWPC) produces reviews of state Underground Injection
95
Control (UIC) programs. GWPC also compiles a list of state agencies that promulgate regulations impacting groundwater and pro96
vides links to the agencies’ websites. An independent organization
drawn from state, industry, and environmental stakeholders, known
as STRONGER (State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental
97
Regulation, Inc.), also offers a set of guidelines against which to
judge state oil and gas environmental programs other than UIC pro98
grams.
New York State has been particularly proactive in identifying potential threats to water resources. The New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation, Division of Mineral Resources, produced a comprehensive draft supplemental generic environmental
99
impact statement (Draft SGEIS) in 2009. As part of this effort, New
100
York asked multiple consulting groups to evaluate the following factors identified as potentially leading to groundwater contamination
from high-volume hydraulic fracturing:

http://www.marcellusshales.com/marcellusshalemap.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2012) (depicting of the contours of the Marcellus Shale superimposed on the states
overlying the formation). The IOGCC is a government agency that spans multiple
states and “works to ensure our nation’s oil and natural gas resources are conserved
and maximized while protecting health, safety and the environment.” About Us,
INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/about-us
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
94
See, e.g., Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection Program Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil & Gas Wells, BUSINESS WIRE
(Sept.
24,
2010),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20100923006018/en/Independent-Review-Completed-Pennsylvania-DepartmentEnvironmental-Protection [hereinafter Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania
Program].
95
Underground Injection Control, GROUND WATER PROTECTION COUNCIL,
http://www.gwpc.org/uic/uic.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
96
State
Information,
GROUND
WATER
PROTECTION
COUNCIL,
http://www.gwpc.org/state_resources/state_resources.htm click on “State Agencies
List” for the Excel spreadsheet) (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
97
List
of
State
Reviews,
STRONGER,
INC.,
http://www.strongerinc.org/reviews/reviews.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
98
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 26.
99
See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14.
100
The New York State Energy Research & Development Authority contracted
with consulting groups for the research needed to produce the SGEIS to ICF International, along with Alpha Environmental, Inc., URS Corporation and NTC Consultants. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37 to -38.
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102

wellbore failure,
103
subsurface pathways,
104
waste transport,
105
centralized flowback water surface impoundments,
106
fluid discharges,
107
treatment facilities,
108
disposal wells,
109
solids disposal,
naturally occurring radioactive material disposition
110
(NORM),
111
cuttings volume,
112
cuttings and liner associated with mud drilling,
potential impacts to subsurface New York City water sup113
ply infrastructure,

A wellbore is also known as a borehole or the hole drilled by the bit. N.Y.
STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, GLOSSARY FOR DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT
STATEMENT
20
(2009),
available
at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/odsgeisglossary.pdf. “A wellbore may have casing in it or it may be open (uncased); or part of it may be cased,
and part of it may be open. Also called a borehole or hole.” Id.
102
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37. “[T]he
probability of fracture fluids reaching an underground source of drinking water
(USDW) from properly constructed wells due to subsequent failures in the casing or
casing cement due to corrosion is estimated at less than 2 x 10-8 (fewer than 1 in 50
million wells).” Id.
103
Id. at 6-37 to -38.
104
Id. at 6-38.
105
Id. at 6-38 to -39. “Operators may propose to store flowback water prior to or
after dilution in the onsite lined pits or tanks . . ., or in centralized facilities consisting of tanks or one or more engineered impoundments.” Id. at 5-113.
106
Id. at 6-39.
107
Id. at 6-39 to -40.
108
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-40.
109
Id.
110
Id. “Marcellus shale is known to contain NORM concentrations at higher levels than surrounding rock formations,” requiring employers to perform testing and
provide appropriate worker protection. Id. at 6-129–6-130. As this impacts water
supplies, however, New York has found that “[b]ased on the analytical results from
field-screening and gamma ray spectroscopy performed on samples of Marcellus
shale, NORM levels in cuttings are not likely to pose a problem.” Id. at 6-40.
111
Id. Cuttings volume consists of “[t]he very fine-grained rock fragments removed by the drilling process [which] are returned to the surface in the drilling fluid
and managed either within a closed-loop tank system or a lined on-site reserve pit.”
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14 at 5-29.
112
Id. at 6-41.
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• degradation of New York City’s drinking water supply,
115
• floodplains,
116
• primary and principle aquifers,
117
• freshwater wetlands, ecosystems and wildlife, and
118
• air quality.
The consulting groups determined that the regulations implemented
in New York are “sufficient to prevent fracturing fluid from flowing
upward along the wellbore and contacting water-bearing strata adja119
cent to the borehole.”
As part of the analysis that led to this conclusion, the groups analyzed the possibility of fracturing fluids mi120
Typical
grating beneath the surface of the ground into USDWs.
conditions for hydraulic fracturing produce wells with similar characteristics: aquifer maximum depth is less than 1000 feet, the fracture
zone is greater than 2000 feet, the average hydraulic conductivity of
intervening strata remains less than 1E-5 cm/sec, and the average po121
rosity of intervening strata is over ten percent.
The report that,
even in circumstances that are most favorable to flow, the current
practices of hydraulic fracturing generate pressures and volumes that
are insufficient “to cause migration of fluids from the fracture zone to
the overlying aquifer in the short time that fracturing pressures
122
would be applied.”
The Draft SGEIS identified at least one regulatory jurisdiction
associated with each of the twenty-seven distinct events in the lifecycle
123
of a horizontal well. The regulatory jurisdictions include local government and health agencies, New York City agencies, New York
124
State agencies, and federal agencies.
114

113

N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-41.
Id. at 6-41 to -42.
115
Id. at 6-42.
116
Id. at 6-42 to -43.
117
Id. at 6-43 to -48.
118
Id. at 6-48 to -94.
119
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-148.
120
Id. at 6-53 to -56.
121
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 5-148.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 8-10 tbl.8.1.
124
Id. Local government agencies included the New York City Department of Environmental Protection; New York State provided oversight through the Department
of Environmental Conservation Divisions & Offices (Division of Mineral Resources,
Division of Environmental Permits, Division of Water, Division of Solid and Hazardous Materials, Division of Fish, Wildlife and Marine Resources, Division of Air Re114

CRICCO-LIZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/17/2012 3:49 PM

COMMENT

719

In Pennsylvania, oil and gas well developers must adhere to the
125
Oil and Gas Act when they drill in the state. Primarily, the Act re126
quires drillers to procure a permit prior to beginning any drilling.
Permit fees are keyed to the length of the wellbore and the permit
127
application requires a water management plan.
Other regulations
address duties that arise before receiving the permit, including surveys, stipulation of angles and directions of non-vertical wells, and
128
provision of notice to surface owners.
Pennsylvania’s Department
of Environmental Protection plays an active, protective, and productive role in the regulation of oil and gas development and produc129
130
tion, including oversight of permit and inspection programs.
2.

Issues Facing State Regulators

Once an agency is tasked with the specific role of regulating a
part of the process, lack of scientific evidence demonstrating specific
risks leaves the agency hobbled. “Regulatory officials from 15 states
have recently testified that groundwater contamination from the hydraulic fracturing procedure is not known to have occurred despite
131
the procedure’s widespread use in many wells over several decades.”
Issues arising in the producing states have largely related to insufficient casing or negligent operation of wells, in violation of existing

sources), the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, the Public
Service Commission, and the Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preservation;
and federal agency involved were identified as the EPA, the United States Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Id.
125
58 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 601.101–.605 (West 1996); see Laura C. Reeder, Creating a
Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale Formation, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1016 (2009). Part IV of the note
provides a comprehensive overview of the Pennsylvania regulation of drilling at both
state and local levels. Id. at 1015–20.
126
Reeder, supra note 125, at 1014.
127
PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., MARCELLUS SHALE WELL PERMIT APPLICATION FEES
FACT
SHEET
(Apr.
2009),
available
at
http://www.elibrary.dep.state.pa.us/dsweb/Get/Document-84138/5500-FSDEP4239.
pdf; Reeder, supra note 125, at 1015, nn.141–42 (citing Oil and Gas Act, 58 PA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 601.101–.201 (West 1996)).
128
§ 601.201.
129
See Office of Oil and Gas Management, PA. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT.,
http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/minres/oilgas/oilgas.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2012).
130
See Independent Review Completed of Pennsylvania Program, supra note 94.
131
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 14, at 6-37.
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regulations.
In June 2010, the blowout of a well drilled into the
Marcellus Shale in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, brought responders from the state, as well as industry experts from Texas and
133
the federal government.
Another blowout in the town of Killdeer
134
resulted in a spill of more than 2000 barrels of oil and frack fluid.
The Killdeer spill was the first well blowout since the Department of
Mineral Resources began requiring both pressure testing and the use
of pressure-release valves during high-pressure hydraulic fracturing
135
procedures in 2008. The Department of Mineral Resources, as the
state’s regulatory agency, has demonstrated a responsive and conser136
vationist attitude since the blowout. The Mineral Resources Director traced the impetus behind the department’s decision to impose
137
regulation in 2008 to the previous blowouts seen in the state. Environmental organizations, however, have complained that the current
regulation lags behind industry innovation and that looming budget
138
cuts will cripple already lax enforcement.
C. Federal Oversight of Hydraulic Fracturing
1.

Federal Statutes Regulate Parts of the Hydraulic
Fracturing Process

General commercial use of complex chemicals, not only in hydraulic fracturing, is subject to scrutiny under numerous federal envi-

132

PA. ST. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OVERVIEW, available
at
http://files.dep.state.pa.us/OilGas/BOGM/BOGM
PortalFiles/MarcellusShale/DEP%20Fracing%20overview.pdf.
133
Gas Well Blowout Under Control in Clearfield County, WJACTV.COM (June 4, 2010,
10:44 AM), http://www.wjactv.com/print/23792353/detail.html [hereinafter Gas
Well Blowout Under Control].
134
Lauren Donovan, Killdeer Oil Spill Being Cleaned Up, Officials Investigate,
TRIBUNE
(Sept.
2,
2010,
12:34
AM),
BISMARCK
http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/article_af6a8bd2-b71211df-b4ff-001cc4c03286.html.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Mark Guarino, Gulf Oil Spill Report Warning: U.S. Must Watch Offshore Drilling
SCI.
MONITOR
(Jan.
11,
2011),
More
Closely,
CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/0111/Gulf-oil-spill-report-warning-US-mustwatch-offshore-drilling-more-closely. “‘The technology, laws and regulations, and
practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up the spills lag behind the real risk associated with [oil and gas production] . . . government must close the existing gap and industry must support rather than resist that effort,’ the report states.”
Id.
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139

ronmental statutes.
All laws, regulations, and permit procedures
that bind conventional oil and gas exploration and production also
attach to activities aimed at producing natural gas from unconven140
tional sources. This Comment, however, examines only the potential results of the Act to amend the SDWA pending in Congress. Under the current version of the SDWA, Congress provided the EPA
with a lever to use against states’ inaction in protecting drinking wa141
ter sources—a means to halt any “race to the bottom.” The typical
justifications for placing environmental regulation under federal control “reflect commonly understood collective action problems, including negative environmental externalities, resource pooling, the
‘race to the bottom,’ uniform standards, and the ‘NIMBY’ (not in my

139

For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers oversees any wetlands necessary permits. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006); see also Steven G. Davison, General Permits Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 35
(2009) (discussing in detail the permit requirements under this federal statute). The
U.S. Department of Transportation oversees transportation of fracturing fluids as
hazardous chemicals. 49 U.S.C. § 5103 (2006). The EPA retains primary jurisdiction
over injection-well disposal under the SDWA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26) (2006).
Additionally, “the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) gives the EPA
the authority to control hazardous waste from the ‘cradle-to-grave.’ This includes the
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.”
Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, EPA (June 28, 2006),
http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/laws/rcra.html; see also Gas Well Blowout Under Control,
supra note 133. In a recent blowout of a well drilled into the Marcellus Shale in
Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, responders came from the state level, as well as industry experts drawn from Texas and the federal government. Id.
140
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25.
141
For a detailed discussion of the “race-to-the-bottom” rationale for environmental regulation, see Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate
Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 597–98 (2008).
Another rationale for federal environmental regulation is the so-called
“race to the bottom.” A race to the bottom assumes that competition
for business and industry will create a prisoner’s dilemma in which
states are driven to relax their environmental standards in order to
gain the economic benefits and tax revenues that the business or industry brings. Individual states have the incentives to lower standards
to compete for industry whether or not other states do the same, even
though the states as a collective would be better off not doing so. Some
environmental law scholars have argued either that the race to the bottom is not an empirical reality or that interjurisdictional competition is
a good thing because it tends to produce socially efficient outcomes.
Other academics have responded that the race to the bottom has been
and remains a factor that provides obstacles to effective state environmental regulation.
Id.
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back yard) phenomenon.” These concerns about pollution are par143
ticularly relevant in the context of protecting drinking water, which
144
consists of both surface and groundwater. The resource of water is
vulnerable to conflicts arising out of non-uniform protection due to
145
Pollution spreads through migratory
its migratory characteristics.
146
resources when states provide insufficiently protective regulation.
The difficulty in providing uniform protection is, in part, due to the
fact that, between more protective and less protective states,
courts are apt to discount or disregard empirical evidence relating
to a statute’s population health impact while accepting almost at
face value claims relating to the burdens a statute imposes on
commerce. Thus not only do the federal courts now frequently
ignore public health claims in particular cases, they also sometimes reject, ostensibly as beyond their competence, the empirical
and epidemiological evidence that public health can provide in
147
support or refutation of particular public health statutes.

As part of the SDWA program, the EPA requires states to develop regulations that at least meet the minimum standards established
by the Agency before the states can obtain federal authorization to
148
run their own UIC program. But, because the SDWA does not explicitly define the term “underground injection” to include the process of hydraulic fracturing, the interpretation of that phrase belongs
149
in the hands of the agency implementing the statute: the EPA. Un142

Id. at 593–94.
The Water Cycle: Ground Water Discharge, USGS (Dec. 27, 2011),
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercyclegwdischarge.html.
144
P. JAYA RAMA REDDY, A TEXTBOOK OF HYDROLOGY 289 (2005) (“A groundwater
basin is filled and the excess water is discharged by several ways until a quasiequilibrium is reached.”).
145
Marc K. Landy, Local Government and Environmental Policy, in DILEMMAS OF SCALE
IN AMERICA’S FEDERAL DEMOCRACY 227, 228 (Martha Derthick, ed. 1999) (“Air and
water move; they do not respect state lines.”). In particular, Landy observed that increased agricultural and industrial output occurring post-World War II resulted in
such significant pollution that economic damage following the detrimental effect on
the environment would indeed spill over state boundaries. Id. at 228–29.
146
WENDY E. PARMENT, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LAW 78, 100–01
(2009).
147
Id. at 97–98.
148
42 U.S.C. § 300h(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006).
149
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 276 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.
2001) (requiring the EPA to determine whether Alabama’s revised UIC program
provided an adequate permitting process for hydraulic fracturing). Using the twopart Chevron test, the court determined that the intent of Congress was not clear as to
whether hydraulic fracturing fell within the purview of “underground injection,” and
thus the Agency was entitled to controlling weight for its interpretation of the
143
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der SDWA § 300g-1, the EPA must establish a maximum acceptable
level for specified contaminants and create a “national drinking water
150
regulation,” but only if certain conditions obtain. The Administrator must first determine that the following three permissive characteristics are present: (1) the contaminant may have an adverse effect
on human health, (2) the likelihood of permeating public water systems at a rate and quantity that gives rise to health concerns has become a “substantial likelihood,” and (3) “in the sole judgment of the
Administrator, regulation of” the contaminant will present the op151
portunity to reduce risk to human health.
Additionally, to ensure that the contaminant is properly categorized, the Administrator must base this determination on “best avail152
able, peer-reviewed science.” The Administrator must examine sev153
en factors, two of which particularly require that “quantifiable and
non-quantifiable health risk reduction benefits” exist “for which there
is a factual basis to conclude” that such benefits would likely follow to
154
identified populations. In light of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, “considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administra155
tive interpretations.” This dynamic is particularly illustrated in the
phrase, despite the existence of other possible interpretations, unless such interpretation was inconsistent with the clear terms of the statute. Id. at 1264.
150
42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006).
151
Id.
152
§ 300g-1 (b)(3)(A)(i).
153
§ 300g-1 (b)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(VII). The statue lists the seven factors to be considered: (1) that reductions in health risks will occur as a result of compliance with the
proposed treatment, (2) that the proposed treatment will target the contaminants
causing the damage, (3) that costs resulting from the regulation are justified, (4) that
the “incremental costs” resulting from compliance with the regulation have been
considered, (5) that the contaminant’s effect(s) on the general public as well as on
children, the elderly, and pregnancies have been considered, (6) that the Administrator has considered any increased health risks stemming from compliance; and (7)
any other “relevant factors,” with discretion vested solely in the administrative agency. Id.
154
§ 300g-1 (b)(3)(C)(i)(I), (II).
155
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (internal citation omitted). Judicial deference is consistent with a co-equal branch of government’s review of matters explicitly delegated
to administrative agencies when Congress relinquishes its discretionary power. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–59 (1983) (holding that Congress may not delegate authority to an executive branch agency while maintaining in the statute a clause granting to itself a legislative veto over actions of the executive branch because that is inconsistent with the bicameralism principle and Presentment Clause of the United
States Constitution).
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SDWA, in which Congress directed the EPA to apply its scientific and
environmental expertise to evaluate best practices and promulgate
appropriate regulatory schemes beyond the scope of the legislature’s
156
expertise or time to manage.
2.

Science, Policy, and Regulation

i.

The EPA’s Application of the Precautionary Principle

The precautionary principle requires that “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relation157
ships are not fully established scientifically.”
This precept is one
that remains deeply entrenched in the environmental management
158
field, and particularly in the American conception of environmen159
tal regulation. Prevention rather than a cure is generally preferred;
it is easier not to drop a fragile vase than it would be to clean up the
myriad shards it would become once it hits the ground. On the other
hand, where two mutually exclusive options present both advantages
and dangers, it is extraordinarily difficult to pick one as the objectively better choice. Similarly, contemporary environmental risks engender complexities of scale, context, and uncertainty that make applica160
tion of the precautionary principle difficult. The application of the
precautionary principle could have a sizeable impact on the scope

156
See The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996: Strengthening Protection for
PROT.
AGENCY,
America’s
Drinking
Water,
ENVTL.
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/sdwa/theme.cfm (last visited Mar. 30,
2012) [hereinafter The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996].
157
Joel A. Tickner, Introduction, in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND
PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY, at xiii, xiii–xiv (Joel A. Tickner, ed. 2003) (quoting the
1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The four central components of the principle, as identified in the
statement, are: “(1) taking preventive action in the face of uncertainty, (2) shifting
burdens onto proponents of potentially harmful actions, (3) exploring a wide range
of alternatives to possibly harmful actions, and (4) increasing public participation in
decision-making.” Id. at xiv (internal quotation marks omitted).
158
MICHAEL FAURE & GORAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY & LAW 19, 21–26 (2003).
159
See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13101 (2006); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 99 (2002). Consider
“the phaseout of lead in gasolines, the use of solar power, and the substitution of
electric cars for cars powered by gasoline.” Id. at 100.
160
Joel A. Tickner, The Role of Environmental Science in Precautionary Decision Making,
in PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY supra note
157, at 3, 4.
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and recommendations of the study that the EPA is currently producing.
ii.

Politics and Public Involvement in EPA Scientific
Practices

The EPA is seeking to involve all interested stakeholders in the
articulation of the scope and methodology of its study on hydraulic
161
fracturing’s effects on groundwater.
This is consistent with the
EPA’s current practices in both community involvement and ac162
“[I]n the context of complex environmental and
countability.
health risks, it is much more useful to think of science and policy as
163
dynamically informing each other . . . .”
Science is the basis on
which to ground policy determinations, and public policy should pri164
The study’s
oritize which environmental issues to research first.
conclusions regarding the practice’s effects on groundwater will undoubtedly influence whether the EPA will regulate the use of hydraulic fracturing. The study would lose integrity, however, if it were
structured around that knowledge so as to affect a particular outcome.
Ideally, if policy-setting behind environmental regulation was
merely an empirical choice, it would be easy—through the weight of
scientific evidence and the significance of intelligent recommendations—to articulate a new program and implement logical changes to
165
the existing procedures.
“However, the policy process is more
complex than superficial change can accommodate. In addition to
context programs and administrative activity, the formulation and
implementation process relies on something deeper and more fun166
damental: a core moral or normative belief.”
Policy sets preferences in funding, priority, and objectives: the message communicated

161

EPA Seeks Gas-Drilling Facts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2010, at B2. The EPA requested and received disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing by the nine
biggest natural gas companies and contractors. Id. The EPA also scheduled several
public meetings for stakeholders. Id.
162
See The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, supra note 156.
163
Tickner, supra note 157, at xiii.
164
Id.
165
John Martin Gillroy & Joe Bowersox, Introduction: The Roots of Moral Austerity in
Environmental Policy Discourse, in THE MORAL AUSTERITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION
MAKING: SUSTAINABILITY, DEMOCRACY, AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENT IN POLICY AND LAW 1,
5 (John Martin Gillroy & Joe Bowersox eds., 2002).
166
Id.
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by the preferences is a moral statement.
That belief must be consistent across the law’s reformulations, despite regular revisions and
opportunity for competing moral standards to devise alternate meth168
ods of operation.
Hydraulic fracturing produces virulent and intractable responses
in its advocates and opponents alike. Such responses in the public
make it difficult to establish a uniform policy. For instance, at a public stakeholders’ meeting that the EPA held in Pennsylvania, Regional
Administrator Judith Enck requested input regarding the design of
the study proposed to be concluded in 2012, “not about the merits of
169
hydraulic fracturing.” And nonetheless, “[n]early all [of the impassioned speakers present] urged the EPA to base its study on science,
rather than emotion or political pressure—as long as it was the sci170
ence that supported their position.”
The public has a limited scientific and historical context from
which it can promote rational views on the preferred balance of eco171
nomic and public health interests. “[I]n recent years, environmental groups and community activists, pointing to inconclusive but
sometimes compelling anecdotes of possible water contamination,
have complained that the drilling practice is far too loosely regulated.
Those complaints increased after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexi172
co.”
Notably, the causes of the BP oil spill are but tenuously con173
nected to possible future EPA regulation of hydraulic fracturing.
This combination of inflammatory discourse and lack of specialized

167
168

Id.
Id.

(paraphrasing GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, EVIDENCE, ARGUMENT AND
PERSUASION IN THE POLICY PROCESS 146–49 (1989)).
169
Maykuth, supra note 40.
170
Id.
171
Zeller, supra note 46.
172
Id.; see infra notes 208–18 and accompanying text.
173
See generally Christian Garcia, Halliburton Comments on National Commission CeWIRE
(Oct.
29,
2010),
ment
Testing,
BUSINESS
http://ir.halliburton.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=67605&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1489
037&highlight= (“Well logs and rig personnel confirm that the well was not flowing
after the cement job. BP and/or others, following the misinterpreted negative results conducted after the cement job proceeded to displace mud in the production
casing and riser with lighter sea water, allowing the well to flow. Given these numerous intervening causes, Halliburton does not believe that the foam cement design
used on the Macondo well was the cause of the incident.”); Ian Urbina, BP Spill Report
Hints
at
Legal
Defense,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
8,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/09/us/09spill.html.
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public knowledge leads to over-promotion of regulation without
meaningful, critical analysis of the likely outcomes of such regulation.
iii. Previous EPA Study on Hydraulic Fracturing’s Impacts
on Drinking Water
The EPA previously produced a study on hydraulic fracturing
that has come under attack for being too influenced by the private
174
sector’s interests.
In 2004, the EPA produced a report evaluating
175
During the first
the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on USDWs.
phase of the study, the EPA identified three specific means through
which contaminants could migrate from the location where hydraulic
fracturing was being used to USDWs: either direct injection into the
USDW, creation of a hydrological connection between the coalbed
and a USDW, or injection into a fracture already in “hydraulic com176
munication with a USDW.” The EPA also studied reports of drinking water well contamination, finding no confirmatory evidence link177
ing the hydraulic fracturing process to the contamination. The first
phase of the study ended the enquiry: the EPA looked at existing literature, interviewed industry and government officials, and solicited
178
comments from concerned citizen and environmental groups.
Based on these preliminary assessments, the EPA concluded that
there was “no conclusive evidence that water quality degradation in
USDWs is a direct result of injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids in-

174
See Wiseman, supra note 57, at 170–80. Part V of Professor Wiseman’s article
details the accusation levied against the EPA’s lack of objectivity in producing the
study, in particular the decision to stop the study before instituting a more comprehensive examination of hydraulic fracturing. Id. at 172. The EPA is not only subject
to the overbearing interests of the private sector; it also faces considerable pressure
from the political party in power during the course of any particular decision. Id. at
178.
175
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS STUDY
(2004),
available
at
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_coal
bedmethanestudy.cfm.
176
Id. at ES-1.
177
Id.
178
Id. at ES-8. The EPA looked at water quality incident reports that may have
been associated with CBM hydraulic fracturing. The Agency examined over 200
peer-reviewed publications, spoke with approximately fifty employees of industry
leaders and officials at state and local government agencies, and contacted more
than 500 local or county agencies in potentially affected areas, receiving no complaints from these officials. Id. at 7-1. The Agency also contacted and took comments from approximately forty concerned citizens and environmental groups. Id.
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to CBM wells and subsequent underground movement of these flu179
ids.”
Additionally, the EPA concluded that chemicals, even if injected directly through USDWs, are unlikely to have more than minimal effect: “groundwater production, combined with the mitigating
effects of dilution and dispersion, adsorption, and potentially biodegradation, minimize the possibility that chemicals included in the frac180
turing fluids would adversely affect USDWs.” Finally, citing the expansive horizontal and vertical distances between most USDWs and
methane coal beds, the EPA determined that the material barrier be181
tween the two would prevent breach and contamination.
In light of the results of the first phase, the EPA declined to produce a time-consuming, expensive study of hydraulic fracturing beyond the scope of the initial question, which it had already an182
swered.
Based on the study’s conclusions, Congress passed the
183
184
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to amend the SDWA, removing hydraulic fracturing from its jurisdiction and ending any perceived ambigui185
ty in the statute.
The FRAC Act, currently pending in Congress,
seeks to change this exception and would require the EPA to regulate
186
hydraulic fracturing.
To properly balance the interests of the oil
and gas industry against those of local businesses, citizens, and state
and local governments, the federal government should approach this
new avenue for regulation with eagerness to cooperate with existing
state statutory schema and a respect for the competing and complementary interests of all parties.
IV. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
A. Overview of Cooperative Federalism
Cooperative federalism models share power between federal and
state or local governments to promote consistency across the nation
187
as well as localized solutions. Within this collaborative dynamic, the
179

Id. at 7-2.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 175, at 7-3.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 7-5.
183
Pub. L. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)
(2006)).
184
42 U.S.C. § 300h (d) (2006).
185
Committee Report: Legislative Committee, 27 ENERGY L. J. 349, 353 (2006).
186
See Lustgarten, supra note 48.
187
Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L. J. 179, 184 (2005). “[C]ooperative federalism . . . requires a greater degree
180
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federal government remains the paramount authority.
For environmental policy, a marked preference for cooperative federalism
189
permeates the statutes enacted over the past thirty years.
The allocation of decision-making authority between federal or
local government, industry, and citizens confronts fundamental questions related to democracy and citizen-government in the United
190
States.
Individual involvement and interest in decision-making
drops precipitously when the benefits connected to a decision are dif191
fused across a large population. This response occurs because the
perceived cost of influencing a self-beneficial outcome outweighs the
192
“Centralized reperceived benefit of promoting that outcome.
gimes relying upon mandatory prescriptions that constrain discretion
on the part of individuals are often accompanied by processes of psychological detachment, social disengagement, and loss of initiative on
the part of those who seek to minimize their individual costs of enof coordination between the two levels of government. Since the New Deal, cooperative federalism typically appears as congressional or administrative efforts to induce
(but not coerce or commandeer) states to participate in a coordinated federal program.” Id.
188
Id. at 183. “The adjectival root, ‘federal,’ aptly implies the strong national government created in the U.S. Constitution to repair the relatively weak central government created by the Articles of Confederation. Therefore, most scholarly approaches to federalism emphasize the national government as the dominant
partner.” Id.
189
See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737–47 (2005).
Part II.B.2.b of Professor Glicksman’s article provides a comprehensive description of
federal environmental statutes employing the use of cooperative federalism ideals in
structure and implementation. Id. at 737–47.
190
See Bruce Ledewitz, The Present and Future of Federalism, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 645,
645–47 (2005). Part I describes the relationship between federalism and the Constitution and the rest of the article examines the importance of political checks provided through federalism concepts. Id. at 645–47.
191
Some federalism incarnations draw heavily from the economic model of competition among the states and local government propounded in 1956 by Tiebout,
who theorized that the mobility of states’ citizenry, when combined with diverse governmental models, would result in the efficient allocation of resources to the public.
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956).
This method of governance reduces the problem of pluralism where fiscal and decisional irresponsibility of representatives abounds because of the “concentration of
benefits in a few hands while the concomitant costs are diffused among the population as a whole.” Landy, supra note 145, at 231. Where a population is large enough
so that each individual is only required to contribute inconsequential amounts to
achieve a single result, citizen involvement in decision-making drops precipitously.
Id. at 232.
192
People with “skills and resources . . . better suited to the national scene have
come to exert enormous leverage in Washington.” Id. at 231.
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trapment.”
Consequently, in a centralized-control regime, the
power to direct regulation would remain in the hands of a few—
either federal officials tasked with regulating the process or those private individuals or corporations with sufficient economic incentive to
participate. Centralized control over environmental issues through
federal regulation has been touted as the apex of regulation for non194
localized issues that is both sufficiently protective and efficient.
While national consistency in environmental protection has decided
benefits, cooperative federalism allows decision-makers to weigh such
benefits against the negative impacts that this kind of national uniformity will have at the local level.
Legislation addressing potential environmental effects on
groundwater from hydraulic fracturing will require significant investment of money for research, broad participation by stakeholders,
and some compromise between two important national interests—
195
energy and protection of natural resources. In matters of this kind,
where “some states may be unwilling to enact statutes, particularly
costly legislation, only national legislation sufficiently addresses these
196
issues.” While states can address and regulate hydraulic fracturing
197
that occurs within the state’s boundaries, suspicion persists that
such regulation does not adequately protect migratory resources.
This is an area where federal regulation might be required because
one state’s efforts to attract industry through looser regulation could
have effects on another state’s water or air supply through down198
stream effects.
Particularly for migratory resources that multiple
states share or that are subject to effects from migratory pollution,
“proponents of a purely federal approach reason that environmental
concerns involve issues, such as air and water, not confined to any
199
one state.”
193

VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A SELFGOVERNING SOCIETY 124 (1991).
194
Krista Yee, “A Period of Consequences”: Global Warming Legislation, Cooperative Federalism, and the Fight Between the EPA and the State of California, 32 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y J. 183, 186 (2008). “Since environmental problems have far reaching effects
on national—in fact, global—concerns, some argue only national legislation can adequately address these issue.” Id.
195
See supra Part II.B.
196
Yee, supra note 194, at 186.
197
For a detailed discussion of state regulation, see supra Part III.B.1.
198
See Ledewitz, supra note 190, at 650 (“Scientifically speaking, there is no such
thing, for example, as intrastate water. All water has moved across state borders in
the past and, of course, will do so again in the future.”).
199
Yee, supra note 194, at 186.
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Despite these concerns, state and local authorities typically take
on great responsibility for implementing broad policy goals, particularly in the realm of environmental protection. Environmental statutes are largely administered through some form of cooperative fed200
eralism, requiring both federal and state participation.
Allowing
states the discretion to deviate from a federally-established norm encourages innovation, and such exploration of alternatives can expose
201
policymaking errors. Additionally, cooperative federalism prevents
some of the inefficiencies and policy failures that plague the command-and-control, centralized regulatory schema. These include inefficiencies associated with having a wide range of programs that cover interwoven aspects of a single problem, the difficulty in
implementing “regulatory programs involv[ing] complex tradeoffs
among competing social goals,” and the over-involvement of any single interest group in setting policy throughout the regulatory pro202
cess.
B. Modified Cooperative Federalism
1.

Criticism of Cooperative Federalism

The federal decision to devolve primary control over the federal
programs—such as the UIC program—to the states has had its critics,
203
despite the above-noted benefits.
The critics point out that, in
practice, devolution can sometimes result in “economic inefficiency
200

See Glicksman, supra note 189, at 737–47.
Part II.B.2.b of Professor
Glicksman’s article provides a comprehensive description of federal statutes employing the use of cooperative federalism ideals in structure and implementation. Id.
201
Henry Butler & Jonathan Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case
for Reallocating Federal Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996).
“[D]ecentralization allows other people to visit on legislators and regulators the content of their preferences and the rigors of the marketplace.” Id. at 35 (citing Peter
H. Aranson, Pollution Control: The Case for Competition, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION:
ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 339, 383–84 (Robert W. Poole, Jr.,
ed., 1982)).
202
Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 41 DUKE L. J. 607, 627 (1991).
203
See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 351, 374 (2000). But see Shelia R. Foster, Meeting the Environmental Justice Challenge: Evolving Norms in Environmental Decisionmaking, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,992, 11,005
(2000) (arguing that despite recent initiatives seeking to require environmental decision-makers to account for the limitations of current risk assessment methodology,
there still exists a normative gap precludes full justice in environmental
decisionmaking); Sheila R. Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459 (2002) (addressing the means necessary to decentralize environmental decision-making without overpowering the voices of vulnerable
communities).
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of reinventing scientific and technical knowledge at the state level
[that] more than counterbalances the supposed advantages of moving the standard-setting aspects of such decision-making closer to the
204
people.” The criticism is accurate—needless repetition of complex
science is an expensive method of encouraging participation by all
interested citizens. In addition, cooperative federalism has been disparaged for fostering several problems: regulations that are less responsive to local preferences, higher taxes that are neither readily
discernible nor traceable to a specific, received benefit, and lower ac205
countability of politicians in both local and national government.
One long-standing critic of cooperative federalism, Dr. Michael
Greve, states that the theory produces insurmountable information
costs, conceals accountability of elected representatives, and voids in206
dividual choice and state competition. His critique dismisses cooperative federalism as insufficiently decentralized government. From
the perspective of the individual citizen, these concerns represent
substantial impediments to participation in policy-setting. “Citizenship is a mix of opportunity and obligation. . . . [A] voice in collective
decisions [requires] . . . a share in the sacrifices those decisions impose. Centralizing policy and politics not only minimizes one’s voice
207
in public affairs, it reduces one’s responsibilities.”
When cooperative federalism fails to protect true diversity of regulatory options, it
devolves into a multi-tiered game of bureaucratic blame-shifting,
where each level of government fails to provide the necessary checks
and balances against the others. As particularly illustrated in the sto208
ry of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, sharing responsibility be204

Steinzor, supra note 203, at 374.
Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. J. 557, 598 (2000)
(“Any form of cooperative federalism will reduce the range of policy variation among
the states and deprive citizens of the benefits of diversity and choice; produce taxation that is hidden and therefore in excess of the voters’ actual preferences; reduce
political transparency; obscure political responsibility; and facilitate political blameshifting.”).
206
MICHAEL S. GREVE, REAL FEDERALISM: WHY IT MATTERS, HOW IT COULD HAPPEN
57 (1999).
207
Landy, supra note 145, at 231.
208
For detailed information about the blowout, see Oil Spill Gulf of Mexico 2010,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2012). On April 20, 2010, the off-shore oil rig Deepwater Horizon had two days of
work left to complete before its crew could place a temporary cap on the oil well that
it had drilled and turn it over to a production platform, which would produce oil
from the well thousands of feet below the surface of the ocean. EMMET MAYER III &
DAN SHEA, WHAT HAPPENED ON THE DEEPWATER HORIZON (2010), available at
http://media.nola.com/news_impact/other/oil-cause-050710.pdf. But as the rig
205
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tween government authorities can result in a lack of transparency and
agency capture.
Both state regulators and federal agencies responsible for
providing oversight of the oil and gas industry had neglected their responsibilities for policing the industry before the incident occurred
and then continued to do so afterwards, instead of ensuring that the
209
operators responded to the spill properly.
Oil and seafood are
210
mainstays of Louisiana’s economy.
The explosion and subsequent
211
spill of an estimated 4.4 million gallons of oil resulted in severe
212
consequences, such as damage to the Louisiana wetlands, injury to
213
the fishing industry, and a temporary moratorium on offshore drill214
ing in the Gulf.
Various commentators have traced the causes of
215
the explosion to industry-wide bad practices, specific operators’
216
217
poor decision-making, and the failure of government regulation.

disconnected, a blowout occurred and the rig exploded, catching fire and eventually
sinking to the bottom of the ocean. Id.
209
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL, FINAL REPORT 78
(2011) (“Perhaps because of the cumulative lack of adequate resources, absence of a
sustained agency mission, or sheer erosion of professional culture within some offices, MMS [Mineral Management Services] came progressively to suffer from serious
deficiencies of organization and management: the fundamental traits of any effective
institution.”); id. at 138 (describing state officials’ confusion over whether the Stafford Act or National Contingency Plan governed the spill response—one of which
put state officials in charge with federal official assisting them, while the other put
federal officials in charge); Steven Mufson, Federal Records Show Steady Stream of Oil
Spills in Gulf Since 1964, WASH. POST, July 24, 2010, at A1. Federal records clearly
point to a consistently poor industry and regulator record with 517,847 barrels
dumped in the Gulf. Id.; see also Jen DeGregorio, Oil and Gas Development Permits
Overwhelmingly Approved by Louisiana, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 30, 2010, at A1. Many federal agencies, such as Mineral Management Services and the Department of Natural
Resources, face dual obligations as both collectors of rents and regulators of the industries they manage. DeGregorio, supra.
210
Chris Kirkham, Oil and Fish Worlds Are Entwined in the Same Net, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
May 9, 2010, at A1.
211
David Hammer, History of Louisiana and Offshore Oil, TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 18,
2010, at A1.
212
David Batker et al., Gaining Ground: Wetlands, Hurricanes, and the Economy: The
Value of Restoring the Mississippi River Delta, 40 E.L.R. 11106, 11107 (2010); Mark
Schleifstein, Splitting the Bill is Tricky, BP’s Expenses Will Continue for Years, TIMESPICAYUNE, May 23, 2010, at A12.
213
Bruce Alpert, The Feds Declare Fisheries Disaster in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 25, 2010, at A4.
214
See Hammer, supra note 211.
215
Dana Milbank, Tusk-Tusk, Oil Execs, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A2.
216
David Hammer, Five Key Human Errors, Colossal Mechanical Failure Led to Fatal
(Sept.
5,
2010,
6:00
AM),
Gulf
Oil
Rig
Blowout,
NOLO.COM
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In particular, the government agencies that bore the responsibility
for regulating the industry were found to have either engaged in unethical collusion with industry insiders or only laxly enforced the reg218
ulations that would have prevented the spill.
Such regulatory failure reduces confidence in local, state, and national governments’
accountability, transparency, and objectivity.
2.

Answers from Fundamental Values of Federalism

As a general political form, federalism is predicated in large part
on competition between government actors to ensure the best provi219
sion of public services. The competition stems from the separation
220
of powers and the functions of the government. The ultimate values of federalism derive from this tension intentionally created between national and local governments:
All federal systems have reference to multiple units of government, each of which has an autonomous existence. . . .
....
. . . Using power to check power amid opposite and rival interests
(to combine phrases from Montesquieu and Madison) implies
that such a system of government will have equilibrating tendencies. . . .
....
http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oilspill/index.ssf/2010/09/5_key_human_errors_colossal_me.html.
217
Mufson, supra note 209. Federal records demonstrate a consistently poor industry and regulator record through the failure that resulted in 517,847 barrels having been dumped in the Gulf. Id.; see also DeGregorio, supra note 209. Many federal
agencies, including the Mineral Management Services and the Department of Natural Resources, have nigh incompatible dual obligations as both collectors of rents
and regulators of the industries they manage. DeGregorio, supra note 209.
218
WILLIAM R. FREUDENBURG & ROBERT GRAMLING, BLOWOUT IN THE GULF: THE BP
OIL SPILL DISASTER & THE FUTURE OF ENERGY IN AMERICA 51–61 (2011). The history of
the relationship between the oil industry and the federal regulators includes such
sordid episodes as sex and drugs passing between the two as well as a long, consistent
history of favoring production of economic benefits over regulation of environmental impacts. Id. The oil industry outpaced the agency in growth and “[t]he number
of accidents, spills and deaths regularly occurring in the region has far surpassed the
agency’s ability to investigate them.” Marc Kaufman et al., MMS Investigations of OilRig Accidents Have History of Inconsistency, WASH. POST (July 18, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/17/AR2010071702807.html.
219
See generally GREVE, supra note 206 (arguing that the benefits of federalism derive from the competition produced among different sovereigns).
220
Greve, supra note 205, at 576 (“[T]he founders sought to foster institutional
conflicts as ‘auxiliary precautions’ against the dangers of an overbearing government.”).
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Government in a democratic society, then, is not simply a matter
of command and control but of providing multiple structures that
221
have reference to diverse methods of problem solving.

The checks and balances ensure that all levels of government compete rather than collude—while intergovernmental collusion (where
federalism dictates governmental competition) eviscerates this fun222
damental protection for citizens as the source of power.
While
people have natural “parochial loyalties” leading to greater interest
and involvement in issues closest to home, the Constitution sought to
empower the national government with sufficient powers and ability
to provide incentives for citizens to overcome these natural inclina223
tions. Simultaneously, the citizens sought to limit the scope of the
federal government’s power to interfere into the realm that the
Founding Fathers envisioned as mere local concerns, so as to create a
224
system that would foster state-specific solutions to local issues.
Federalism promotes diversity of local solutions to widespread issues, prevention of tyranny, and citizen participation in democracy,
as well as “the improvement of economic efficiency through competition among the states, the acceleration of progress through experimentation by the states, and perhaps the protection of certain values
225
of community.”
Cooperative federalism, however, decreases competition between governments. By its very nature, the theory works
through collaboration between different governments, promoting
226
both vertical and horizontal cooperation.
Coordination of broad-scale efforts with the minute details of
particular situations requires multi-tiered cooperation to ensure that
national standards are followed and to provide incentives for reluc227
tant jurisdictions to accept an unwanted standard.
Unfortunately,
221

OSTROM, supra note 193, at 7, 16, 17.
See id. at 16–17. To compete, each seeks the preference and approval of the
citizens under its jurisdiction. Id. In addition, the state and local governments can
engage in a horizontal form of competition for each other’s citizens. See id.
223
See John Kincaid, The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of
Federal Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY
& EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 87, 87 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds.,
1991).
224
“Dual federalism stresses the need for a constitutional distribution of powers
that maintains coordinate, semiautonomous governments able to perform exclusive
and concurrent functions.” Id. at 89.
225
Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering
Rule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2000).
226
Greve, supra note 205, at 566.
227
Id. at 596.
222
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the price of uniformity is that the system is rigid, insofar as the participants fight off attempts to alter who it favors. The opportunity to affect national policy creates high stakes for big-interest involvement
and the resultant policy schema correspondingly accommodates political and interest group influences, thus “giving organized groups a
228
stake in the system.” This in turn reduces the number of successful
challenges to a set protocol, not because the system rests on an ideal
or unnaturally high-quality model, but merely because the political
economy surrounding the system is antagonistic towards giving up
229
any power in the burgeoning bureaucracy.
The solution to this
quandary is to reinsert fundamental federalism values of separate,
concurrent governance by the different levels of government in order
to inject competition into the system. By returning competitive elements to cooperative federalism, the preference for a national standard that allows maximum transfer of funds and minimal accountability will be held in check by placing more decision-making power
closer to impacted populations.
V. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM WILL ENSURE PROPER REGULATION
IF BALANCED WITH DUE WEIGHT FOR STATE VARIATION
Despite its problems, cooperative federalism is the best method
for approaching regulation of hydraulic fracturing. As an issue that
draws heated and intractable responses from both adherents and critics, hydraulic fracturing is susceptible to overly rosy impact analysis by
industry insiders and apocalyptic fear from environmental advocates.
Informational asymmetries create difficulties for policy-setting bodies—whether they are local governments writing ordinances, state
legislators drafting well bond requirements, or the EPA putting together a national scientific study. Each level of decision-making,
however, has its own strengths and abilities to protect certain interests, and cooperative federalism will allow these individual contributions to be reflected in the final regulatory schema.
State and local officials are necessarily more familiar with the
terrain, processes, and current practices of the industry due to their
history of regulating hydraulic fracturing as well as the state regula230
tors’ closer relationships with the geographical areas. Accordingly,
state and local officials are better suited to effectively attend to regu228

Id. at 560.
Id. at 596.
230
For a discussion of state regulation of hydraulic fracturing, see supra Part
III.B.1.
229
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latory activities governing hydraulic fracturing. Moreover, permitting
states to produce regulatory frameworks that further local goals will
promote adaptive and particularized regulation, as opposed to a fed231
eral one-size-fits-all solution.
However, state officials face looming
budgetary restraints and growing informational asymmetries that
make policy setting and enforcement a daunting task.
To stay abreast of the dynamic expansion of the energy industry,
both complex science and nuanced approaches to regulation are
necessary. Energy-producing companies are driven by profit and innovation, and they change technological marvels more quickly than
regulators can produce scientific evidence of harm. The regulatory
schema should represent both accurate science and citizens’ preferences for environmental protection and industry development. In
formulating these regulations, the precautionary principle can provide guidance in the complex decision-making process if elected rep232
resentatives make broader, normative decisions:
While the precautionary principle can remind us of our moral duty to prevent harm in general, it cannot prescribe what kind of
sacrifice we should be prepared to make in each and every case.
Thus the precautionary principle has the semantic status of a
233
general norm rather than of a step-by-step rule of operation.

When regulatory decisions require policy setting, a focused use of the
precautionary principle will produce regulations that protect industry
as well as the environment. Normative values underlie decisions that
evaluate the extent to which the environment should be protected in
a way that prejudices industry. This is a function best suited for the
legislative branch rather than being shoehorned into the restricted
234
authority delegated to an administrative agency.
The decisions
about how to shape the landscape of the energy industry should be
made with the help of consumers who have direct knowledge of the
associated hardships or by their elected representatives, but not by
appointed agency administrators who cannot be held directly accountable for the wide-reaching consequences of their decisions.
231

U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 15, at 25.
The precautionary principle encourages avoidance of potentially risky activities
where all risks have yet to be identified. This principle is difficult to follow when one
population bears the risks that bring profit to a proponent of the activity. See FAURE
& SKOGH, supra note 158, at 19–26.
233
Id. at 22.
234
Matthias Kaiser, Ethics, Science, and Precaution: A View from Norway, in
PRECAUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AND PREVENTATIVE PUBLIC POLICY, supra note
157, at 21, 22.
232
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Modifying cooperative federalism to reflect the core, competitive
values of federalism may cure some of the ills engendered by sharing
responsibility. By deliberately leaving room for states to enact variations of a federal program or protective scheme, rather than mandating the adoption or implementation of a uniform one, a more competitive, modified form of cooperative federalism will produce
regulations that reflect the moral decision-making of impacted populations. Such potential variations do not need to be enunciated in a
federal statute with explicit, limited possibilities. Instead, letting the
states independently develop multiple methods of reaching a federally mandated level of protection would be more beneficial. This
breathing room can permit some states to enact more stringent regulations, encourage others to provide tax exemptions to conforming
businesses, and force others to find funds for investment in infrastructure that can ameliorate the greater burdens on individuals or
businesses who must comply with the environmentally protective reg235
ulation.
A solution that reflects these values of modified cooperative federalism will provide a flexible, national, minimum standard
236
that leaves room for state variation.
The federal government faces a recent, large-scale example of
237
federal agencies’ failure to regulate the oil industry properly. Congress must calculate the balance of power between the state and federal government in order to protect the environment and the citi235
See, e.g., Patricia Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New Meaning
to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10562 (2010). Professor Salkin provides examples for recommendations to federal and state governments “to ensure that local governments have the tools, resources, authority, and
support needed” to address the root causes of greenhouse gases and implement national policies for dealing with them. Id. at 10570–71.
236
Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement
of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1697–98 (2001). Professor Weiser argues
that lack of unified vision for the singular roles of federal regulatory agencies, state
government, and federal judges has resulted in a failure to properly implement the
cooperative federalism ideals set out in recent federal statutes. Id. at 1692–93.
Cooperative federalism regulatory programs, which combine federal
and state authority in creative ways, strike many courts and commentators as a messy and chaotic means of generating federal law. Compounding the hostility to such regimes, some argue that globalization
and technological change leave little or no role for states in implementing complex regulatory regimes and thus endorse a “preemptive
federalism” that relies primarily or exclusively on federal courts or administrative agencies to develop unitary and pinpointed federal policies.
Id. at 1693.
237
See supra notes 208–19 and accompanying text.
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zens’ and commercial interests, not to spread liability and avoid accountability. The natural gas industry does not need to submit more
paperwork that overworked federal employees will process and that
will never reach state officials. Instead, the industry needs a clear set
of authorities that force it to answer for any negligent practices or
failed innovations.
The protection of groundwater must not be subordinate to the
development of natural gas. But neither should the resources lying
beneath the surface of the affected states be put into indefinite stasis.
The best option should be more creative than a hastily-concocted
moratorium that merely panders to the fears of an elected official’s
base. The EPA needs more time to study the actual effects of hydraulic fracturing chemicals on groundwater. Accordingly, states should
avoid shutting down the industry due to lack of publicly available
studies. States have other options to explore, such as instituting a
staggered system of permitted activity that allows the industry to frack
wells in low-risk geographical areas, but does not allow hydraulic fracturing in areas where the chemicals would present greater risks. A
model of regulation drawn from modified principles of cooperative
federalism would allow the EPA to produce a sufficiently comprehensive investigation of the inherent risks of hydraulic fracturing while
avoiding damage to the industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment draws from the mechanical process of hydraulic
fracturing and current state regulations to provide historical context
for the EPA’s forthcoming study. There are already federal statutes
that regulate parts of the hydraulic fracturing process as well as gaps
in the regulatory scheme, which the FRAC Act is intended to fill. Science and politics are dynamic forces shaping the format of the study.
Recent failures in both federal and state agencies’ accountability and
ability to respond to disasters, as seen in the BP blowout, demonstrate
the danger when poorly designated authority results in catastrophic
breakdowns where federal and state powers overlap.
Under the SDWA, the EPA possesses the authority to set national
238
policy goals for individual states to implement UIC programs. Practical application of cooperative federalism in this context would require the EPA to implement a federal solution only when states show
that they are incapable of maintaining adequately a regulatory pro238

See supra Part III.C.1.
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gram. The balance of competing interests—the need for sources of
energy and the need to protect our water resources—calls for a respectful solution; solution that does not smother an industry while
239
providing necessary resources for our consumption, but which also
protects our most vital resource. A partnership can develop between
state and federal governments where the federal government provides uniform science and a minimum standard to calm individual
concerns, but leaves room for more stringent or specific regulation to
local government sources. This cooperation will provide the most
comprehensive, protective, and accountable regulation of the natural
gas industry, while preserving a balance between the competing interests.

239

An IHS Global Insight study found that federal regulation would reduce gas
production by 4.4 Tcf, or twenty-two percent, and reduce oil production by 400,000
b/d, or eight percent, by 2014. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC AND
ENERGY PROPOSALS TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 1–2 (2009), available at
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/IHS_GI_Hydra
ulic_Fracturing_Exec_Summary.pdf.

